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COMMENT
CROSSING THE BORDER LINE:
INTERPRETING FEDERAL DRUG
TRAFFICKING STATUTES IN UNITED
STATES v. LONDONO-VILLA
In an effort to combat the "growing menace of drug abuse"' in
the United States and to eradicate illegal drug trafficking, Con-
gress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970 ("the Act").2 Since the enactment of this legisla-
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4567.
2 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971
(1988)). The Act consolidated more than 50 drug control laws into a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme. Id. It was enacted in the late 1960s in response to a growing concern about
drug abuse and drug trafficking. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 1, at 4567-71; Legisla-
tion To Regulate Controlled Dangerous Substances and Amend Narcotics and Drug Laws,
1970: Hearings on H.R. 1444 Before the Subcomm. on House Ways and Means, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 196 (1970) (statement of President Richard Nixon); see also Michael J. Gardner,
Maritime Drug Smuggling Conspiracies: Criminal Liability for Importation and Distribu-
tion, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 218 (1985) (title III, enacted in response to widespread
drug abuse in 1960s, modified and consolidated drug laws).
"The United States government has been conducting a campaign against drug abuse
and narcotics trafficking since 1914." Joseph R. Brendel, Note, The Marijuana on the High
Seas Act and Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels, 25 Wi. & MARY L. REV. 313, 313 (1983);
see also Harrison Narcotics Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (repealed 1970)
(requiring individuals authorized to manufacture or handle certain drugs to register with
Collector of Internal Revenue and maintain records of sales and purchases). For a historical
overview of federal narcotics laws, see SAMUEL M. LEVINE, NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE §§
4.8-4.42, at 101-26 (1973). Prior to the enactment of the Harrison Narcotics Act, it was
"unlawful to import narcotic drugs into the United States or to buy, sell, transport, or con-
ceal them knowing that they have been illegally imported." United States v. Masullo, 489
F.2d 217, 220 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973).
The principal purpose of the Act was to "deal in a comprehensive fashion with the
growing menace of drug abuse" by "strengthen[ing] existing law enforcement authority in
the field of drug abuse" and increasing research and prevention efforts. H.R. REP. No. 1444,
supra note 1, at 4566-67. The House Report set out the primary purpose of title III (now
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tion, the United States has focused its drug control efforts on illicit
importation,' a response to the international dimensions of the
narcotics control problem.4 Major offenses involving the illegal im-
codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-966 (1988)), which pertains to the regulation of importation and
exportation of controlled substances. Id. It states in part that "[tihe changes providing for
stricter supervision of the importation and exportation of depressant and stimulant drugs
are intended to prevent the diversion of these substances into illicit channels, a problem
which the present statutory requirements have proven insufficient to meet." Id. at 4637-38;
see also United States v. Palella, 846 F.2d 977, 980 (5th Cir.) (Act represents scheme "to
suppress and, hopefully, ultimately terminate the illegal distribution of drugs from whatever
source, foreign or domestic"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988); United States v. Baker, 609
F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1980) (Act represents congressional effort to eliminate all illegal drug
trafficking); United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509, 513 (6th Cir.) (in enacting chapter, Con-
gress was intent on strengthening enforcement of existing drug laws), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
972 (1978).
3 See Clifford Krauss, U.S. Reports Gains in Drug War, but the Battles Keep on Shift-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1991, at A6. Since President Bush announced his national strategy
for drug control in January 1990, federal spending to combat drug trafficking and abuse has
jumped from $6.3 billion in 1989 to $9.5 billion in 1990 to an estimated $10.4 billion in 1991.
Id.
, See Kevin Fisher, Note, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Control: Slamming the
Stable Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 353, 353 n.5 (1984)
("All of the opiate derivatives and an estimated 90 to 95% of the marijuana on the U.S.
market come from foreign countries."). "[Tihe United States has long possessed the ability
to attach criminal consequences to acts occurring outside this country which produce effects
within the United States." United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)). In Strassheim, Justice Holmes
stated that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detri-
mental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been
present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power."
Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285. This is known as the "objective territorial theory" of jurisdic-
tion. See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1513. In addition, even if a defendant never performed
any act within the United States, he may still be reached if he participated in a conspiracy
in which some co-conspirator's actions occurred within the United States. See Baker, 609
F.2d at 138. For cases upholding jurisdiction over foreigners who conspired to import nar-
cotics into the United States but never entered the country, see United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 885-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585
F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 981 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
Statutes may be given extraterritorial effect if the nature of the law permits it and
Congress intends it. See Baker, 609 F.2d at 136 ("Absent an express intention on the face of
the statutes ... the exercise of that power may be inferred from the nature of the offenses
and Congress' other legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved."). Further-
more, the Second Circuit has long recognized that Congress may legislate with respect to
conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits of international law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (discussing
power of State to punish conduct outside its borders). "As long as Congress has expressly
indicated its intent to reach such conduct, 'a United States Court would be bound to follow
the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'" United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1984), modified by
728 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
U.S. v. LONDONO-VILLA
portation5 and exportation of controlled substances 6 are governed
by sections 951 through 966 of the Act.7 Section 952(a) makes it
unlawful "to import into the United States from any place outside
thereof, any controlled substance."' Section 963 targets conspira-
cies to import drugs,9 and section 960 sets forth the penalties for
importing or conspiring to import narcotics in violation of sections
952 and 963.10
Some courts have construed the phrase "into the United
States" in section 952(a) to relate to the mens rea of the crime.1'
With respect to extraterritorial seizures, these courts have ruled
that the statute permits prosecutions of individuals acting outside
U.S. borders only if they specifically intended to import contra-
band into the United States. 2 Recently, in United States v.
F.2d 1326, 1134 (2d Cir. 1972)).
1 See 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1988). The Act defines "import" as "any bringing in or
introduction of [a controlled substance] into any area ..... Id. In addition, the term "im-
portation" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "[t]he act of bringing goods and mer-
chandise into a country from a foreign country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 755 (6th ed.
1990).
I See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988). The Act categorizes controlled substances into a five-
schedule system which ranks drugs according to their potential for danger. Id. Drugs are
classified with respect to their potential for abuse, current medical use (if any), and poten-
tial for harm (with Schedule I drugs being the most dangerous). Id.
See id. §§ 951-966.
8 Id. § 952(a).
o See 21 U.S.C.A. § 963 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) ("Any person who attempts or con-
spires to commit any offense.., in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as
those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy.").
10 Id. § 960(a) ("Any person who ... knowingly or intentionally imports or exports a
controlled substance ... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.").
The penalties for the offenses are designed to correspond with the seriousness, nature, and
quantity of the substances. See id. § 960(b).
" See, e.g., United States v. Bollinger, 796 F.2d 1394, 1405 (11th Cir. 1986) (knowledge
that cocaine was ultimately bound for United States held necessary to sustain conviction for
conspiracy to import), modified on other grounds, 837 F.2d 436, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009
(1988); United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1984) (knowing and intentionill
conspiracy to import into United States was necessary element to be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt). But see United States v. Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585, 587 (1st Cir. 1988)
(specific intent to import narcotics into United States did not need to be proved where
drugs were discovered in airline passenger's suitcase during scheduled stopover in United
States); United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 271 (1st Cir. 1987) "Nothing in §
952(a) makes the accused's knowledge that she Was landing on American soil, or her intent
to do so, an element of the offense."); United States v. Friedman, 501 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th
Cir.) (section 952(a) makes it illegal to import controlled substances into United States
"without requirement for any particular specific intent"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1054 (1974).
12 See United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1986) (individual
intent to import and distribute marijuana into United States required for conspiracy to
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Londono- Villa,1 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit extended this specific intent requirement to seizures of
contraband within U.S. borders and held that in order to establish
violations of sections 952, 960, and 963, the government must
prove that the defendant knew or intended the destination of the
narcotics to be the United States. 14
Londono-Villa involved the activities of various individuals
who met in Panama on several occasions to discuss a plan to trans-
port a quantity of cocaine from Colombia to the United States
through Panama."' Although the defendant, Mauricio Londono-
Villa, did not participate in the negotiations, he accompanied one
of the central conspirators to Panama for the last of these meet-
ings. 16 Londono-Villa's role was to aid in the navigation of a small
plane from Panama City to an airstrip in Colombia, where the
shipment of cocaine was to be waiting.' When the plane reached
Colombia, Londono-Villa examined the cocaine and assisted in
loading it onto the plane.'9 He then gave the pilot directions out of
violate § 952(a)); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1269 (5th Cir.) (government must
meet burden of showing that conspiracy to import marijuana was directed at United States),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Bright, 550 F.2d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1977)
(agreement to commit offense against United States is essential element of criminal conspir-
acy to import marijuana).
" 930 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1991).
" Id. at 998. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) provides that "[wihoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal." The Londono-Villa court failed to address this charge in its
holding or to discuss the mens rea requirement for the separate charge of aiding and abet-
ting as distinguished from the conspiracy charge. See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 997-1001.
The significance' of this treatment by the court is discussed infra at note 71 and accompany-
ing text.
" United States v. Londono-Villa, 735 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 930
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1991). Cocaine is Colombia's most successful export commodity. See
James Brooke, Cali, the 'Quiet' Drug Cartel, Profits by Accommodation, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 1991, at Al. ("According to a recent study by Salomon Kalmanovitz, a Bogota econo-
mist, traffickers in 1990 brought back as much as $3.5 billion-roughly triple the amount
earned from the sale of coffee, the country's largest legal export."). The Cali cartel, Colom-
bia's newest cocaine cartel which "has devised endless ways to hide contraband in commer-
cial cargo and launder it through third countries," produces 70% of the cocaine in the
United States today. See Elaine Shannon, New Kings of Coke, TIME, July 1, 1991, at 28, 29-
31.
" Londono- Villa, 930 F.2d at 995.
"7 Id. Londono-Villa was familiar with the airstrip since he had flown to it many times.
Id.
'" Id.
" Id. at 996.
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Colombia and helped refuel the plane.20 Londono-Villa remained
in Colombia while the cocaine was transported to Panama and
eventually to the United States.21 The defendant was charged with
conspiring to import cocaine into the United States in violation of
sections 952, 960, and 963 and of aiding and abetting the importa-
tion of cocaine in violation of section 2 of title 18.22 At the trial,
the jury was charged that "'the defendant need not have specific
knowledge that the cocaine was to be imported into the United
States.' ",23 Londono-Villa was convicted of both charges and sub-
sequently moved for an arrest of judgment and a new trial.24 The
district court denied both motions.25
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of conviction, 26 finding that "[t]he 'knowingly or inten-
tionally imports' language chosen by Congress implies that, to be
guilty of a criminal offense under sections 952 and 960, the defend-
ant must have known or intended the area into which the goods
11 Appellant's Brief at 7, United States v. Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1991)
(No. 90-1339).
21 Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 996. "Central America's primary role in the narcotics
trade is as a transshipment point for cocaine coming from South America and intended for
sale in the United States." Shirley Christian, Central America a New Drug Focus, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at A10. "Panama, technically not part of Central America though
closely linked, has long been considered an important part of the drug network .... " Id.
22 United States v. Londono-Villa, 735 F. Supp. 543, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 930
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1991).
23 Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 996 (quoting supplemental jury instructions). At the trial,
no evidence was presented indicating that the United States had been mentioned in the
defendant's presence. Id. at 996-97. At the close of the evidence Londono-Villa asked the
district court to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he knew or intended the destination of the cocaine to be the United
States. Id. at 996. The district court declined to do so, finding the "into the United States"
language of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) to be jurisdictional in nature. Londono-Villa, 735 F. Supp. at
546-47. In response to the jury's requests for clarification, the district court gave a supple-
mental instruction that specific intent was not an element of the crime. Londono-Villa, 930
F.2d at 996.
No testimony was adduced at the trial indicating that Londono-Villa participated in the
negotiations for the cocaine transaction or that he knew that the drugs were destined for the
United States. Id. at 995-96. The only testimony offered on this issue was that of a Drug
Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) agent who testified that Panama is commonly used as
a transshipment point for narcotics from Columbia to the United States as well as to other
countries. Id.
24 Londono-Villa, 735 F. Supp. at 544.
21 Id. at 549. The district court sentenced Londono-Villa to ten years' imprisonment on
the aiding and abetting count but suspended the imposition of sentence on the conspiracy
count and instead imposed a five-year term of probation. See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at
995.
21 Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 995.
1992]
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were to enter."27 Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Kearse rea-
soned that Congress failed to use a statutory formulation that
would reach those acting outside of the United States who contrib-
ute to the trafficking of drugs regardless of their knowledge or in-
tent as to destination. 8 Relying on United States v. Conroy2" and
United States v. Bollinger,"° the Londono-Villa court concluded
that to find a defendant guilty of conspiring to import narcotics in
27 Id. at 998. Deriving a specific intent requirement from reading §§ 952 and 960 in
conjunction with one another, the Londono- Villa court stated that the word "import" con-
notes "not just ... movement of goods but of their entry into a given area." Id. Because §
952(a) itself contains no penalty provision and § 960(a) and () outline the penalties for a
violation of § 952, the court determined that the "knowingly or intentionally imports" lan-
guage found in § 960 relates back to and modifies the phrase "into the United States." Id.
28 Id. at 998. The court acknowledged that in § 801(3) of the Act, Congress recognized
that " '[a] major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and
foreign commerce,' 21 U.S.C. § 801(3), and that '[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, dis-
tribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and
detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.'" Id. at 999.
However, the court concluded that
the threat to the "health and general welfare of the American people" is imminent
as soon as the forbidden substances arrive in this country, even if the drug traf-
ficker meant them to go elsewhere .... The fact remains that, as it structured the
sections of the Act, Congress made a violation of § 952 punishable only if the
"import[ation]" was knowing or intentional.
Id. at 999.
Moreover, the court stated that "if there were a lacuna in the law ... it would be the
prerogative of Congress to decide whether to enact legislation to fill it." Id. at 1001.
20 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979). In Conroy, the defend-
ants, whose ship was intercepted outside U.S. waters, were charged with conspiring to im-
port marijuana into the United States. Id. at 1262. One of the defendants, whose relevant
actions occurred outside the United States, maintained that he thought the ship was bound
for Canada. Id. at 1273. Fearful that it would overstep federal authority and interests by
inserting itself into "a conspiracy entered into abroad directed ... at another foreign coun-
try," the Conroy court stated that the government was required to show "that the conspir-
acy to import was directed at the United States." Id. at 1270. Significantly, all of the cases
cited by the Londono-Villa majority to support its main contention that specific intent is
required for the substantive offense of importation involved conspiracy convictions, not aid-
ing and abetting convictions. See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 999; see also supra note 14
and accompanying text (noting court did not address mens rea requirement); infra note 71
and accompanying text (discussing court's failure to distinguish between mens rea required
for conspiracy conviction and aiding and abetting conviction).
30 796 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, 837 F.2d 436, cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988). In Bollinger, the defendant was charged with conspiring to im-
port cocaine into the United States. Id. at 1404. Relying on its decision in United States v.
Boldin, 779 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986), in which the Elev-
enth Circuit determined that § 963 requires a showing of knowledge that a controlled sub-
stance would be imported into the United States, the court in Bollinger required the gov-
ernment to show that the defendant knew that the cocaine he flew from Bolivia to
Honduras was to be imported into the United States. Id. at 1404-05.
U.S. v. LONDONO-VILLA
violation of sections 952 and 963, the government must prove that
the defendant knew or intended the drugs to be destined for the
United States. 1
In a strong dissent, Circuit Judge McLaughlin argued that
from a linguistic standpoint, and in light of the clear congressional
purpose behind the Act, the majority's construction of the statute
was "inappropriate."32 Judge McLaughlin urged that "[s]ection
952(a) makes no mention of a specific intent"33 and that "the ma-
jority's interpretation ignores the express definition of the term
'import.' ",.4 In addition, Judge McLaughlin concluded that in fur-
therance of congressional intent "to exert all means at its disposal
to combat drug trafficking,"35 the phrase "into the United States"
3, Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1000-01. The Londono-Villa court was unpersuaded by
the government's contention that the First Circuit's rulings in United States v. Franchi-
Forlando, 838 F.2d 585 (lst Cir. 1988), and United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268 (1st
Cir. 1987), warranted the conclusion that § 952 does not contain an element of specific in-
tent. Londono- Villa, 930 F.2d at 1000; see also supra note 11 (discussing Franchi-Forlando
and Mejia-Lozano cases). Instead, the Londono-Villa court distinguished both cases on the
ground that they involved airline passengers carrying narcotics who voluntarily boarded
planes scheduled to stop in the United States before heading for their ultimate destinations.
See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 100. "Thus, in both cases, there was in fact adequate proof
of intent, for it is generally permissible to infer that a person intends the ordinarily foresee-
able consequences of his or her actions." Id.
In addition, in rejecting the government's contention that the creation of a specific -
mens rea requirement would permit a drug trafficker to escape liability simply by claiming
ignorance of the shipment's destination, the Londono-Villa court stated that "[w]e see no
reason why such a person could not be tried on a conscious-avoidance theory." Id. at 1000-
01.
"Conscious-avoidance" or "willful-blindness" theories are often employed by courts
where a particular defendant claims to lack "some specific aspect of knowledge necessary
[for] conviction but where the evidence may be construed as deliberate ignorance." United
States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986); see also
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699-700 (9th Cir.) (defendant deliberately refrained
from knowing whether drugs were inside secret compartment of truck he was paid to drive
into United States from Mexico), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); Rollin M. Perkins,
"Knowledge" as a Mental State Requirement, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (1978) (describing
"conscious-avoidance" theory).
32 Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1001 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Mc-
Laughlin argued that the knowledge requirement in § 960(a) was designed merely to exclude
"the innocent traveller" who inadvertently picks up another's luggage containing narcotics.
Id. at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). Conceding that "the statutory scheme embodied in
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a) is not a paragon of clarity," Judge McLaughlin believed that
"pervasive and persuasive evidence of congressional purpose resolves the ambiguity in the
statutory scheme." Id. 1001-03 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
" Id.; see also supra note 5 (setting forth Act's definition of "import").
' Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). Judge McLaughlin
also noted that "American treaty obligations require the United States to cooperate with
19921
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found in section 952(a) "is for jurisdictional purposes only" and
"does not constitute any part of the mens rea of the crime."' 36
It is submitted that the Londono-Villa court erroneously in-
terpreted sections 952 and 960 of the Act by applying the mens rea
element found in section 960 to the substantive offense of illegally
importing narcotics into the United States as defined in section
952. It is suggested that the dissent's interpretation of the statu-
tory language in the Act is correct because it gives effect to both
the fair import of the words and the congressional purpose of the
statutes. This Comment will examine the express language of sec-
tions 952 and 960 and the legislative purpose underlying those
statutes. It will then discuss current case law interpreting related
federal drug trafficking statutes. Furthermore, this Comment will
suggest that both the majority and the dissent in Londono-Villa
failed to make a vital distinction between the mens rea require-
ments for the offense of conspiracy and for the offense of aiding
and abetting, thereby erroneously vacating the defendant's convic-
tion for the latter. Finally, this Comment will conclude that the
majority's reading of the statutes frustrates the fundamental pur-
pose of the Act-"to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the
growing menace of drug abuse in the United States . . . through
providing more effective means for law enforcement. ' 37
I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
A. Literal Analysis
Section 952 of the Act states that "[i]t shall be unlawful to
import into the ... United States from any place outside thereof,
• . . any controlled substance. ' 38 The section defines the substan-
tive offense and, in language devoid of any reference to specific
other signatories in suppressing international drug trafficking." Id. at 1003 (McLaughlin, J.,
dissenting) (citing Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, ratified by U.S. in 1967); see also United States v. Feld, 514 F. Supp. 283,
288 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (section 952(a) is "among the penal provisions that the United States
has adopted to effectuate its treaty obligations under the Single Convention").
36 Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting); see also Londono-
Villa, 735 F. Supp. at 547 ("[T]he 'into the United States' language was inserted ... to
insure that § 952 be applied only against those individuals engaged in conduct which has
effects inside the United States.").
37 H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 1, at 4567.
3 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1988).
[Vol. 66:487
U.S. v. LONDONO-VILLA
intent, targets the importation of narcotics into the United
States.3" Section 960(a)(1), however, introduces a knowledge/intent
requirement by providing that a defendant violates section 952
when he "knowingly or intentionally imports ... a controlled sub-
stance."40 The statute thus creates a dilemma with respect to the
elements necessary to prove a violation of section 952.41
Examination of the plain meaning 4 2 of these two sections does
not resolve the ambiguity created by the legislature's injection of a
specific intent requirement into section 960(a), which requirement
is lacking in section 952's definition of the criminal conduct that
section 960 purports to penalize. The Londono-Villa majority dealt
with this issue by construing section 960(a) as if it were part of the
definition of the criminal offense set forth in section 952.13 In par-
ticular, the court combined the "into the United States" language
in section 952 and the "knowingly and intentionally imports" lan-
guage in section 960(a) and concluded that to be guilty of a crimi-
nal offense under sections 952 and 960, the defendant must know
or intend that the drugs are destined for the United States."4 Such
3D Id.
40 Id. § 960(a).
" See id.; supra note 10.
42 See WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 75-82 (2d ed. 1984).
"The meaning of a statute must.., be sought in the language in which ... [it] is framed,
and if that is plain,... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."
Id. at 75 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916)); see also Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916) ("Where the language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise. ... ); United States v.
Payden, 759 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Where statutory language is clear and unambigu-
ous we are not at liberty to adopt an interpretation different from that directed by the
language.").
"' See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). The Londono-
Villa majority found it "plain that § 960(a) is part of the definition of the criminal offense
of importation into the United States." Id. at 997. However,
as Kenneth Abraham observes,
A statute without a purpose would be meaningless.... [T]o speak of the
literal meaning of a statute ... is already to have read it in the light of
some purpose, to have engaged in an interpretation.
In other words, any reading that is plain and obvious in the light of some
assumed purpose (and it is impossible not to assume one) is a literal reading; but
no reading is the literal reading in the sense that it is available apart from any
purpose whatsoever.
Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordi-
nary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4
CRITICAL INQUIRY 625, 633 (Summer 1978). "A sentence that seems to need no interpretation
is already the product of one." Id. at 637.
" See id.
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an interpretation frustrates the fundamental purpose of the Act
and "create[g] an unnecessary obstacle to the enforcement of the
drug laws."4 While section 960(a) describes the knowledge that a
defendant must possess in order to be subject to penalties, 46 it is
submitted that the section does not impliedly contain the words
"into the United States" because Congress did not intend to re-
quire that a defendant know the destination of the drugs in order
to be criminally liable for importing a controlled substance.47
From a semantic standpoint, 48 the Londono-Villa court's in-
terpretation of sections 952(a) and 960(a) distorts the overall stat-
utory scheme of the Act.49 The Londono- Villa court's misinterpre-
tation apparently stems from an attempt to decipher the meaning
of the constituent structure" "knowingly or intentionally imports"
as it appears in section 960 without regard for the syntactical
structure of the individual section.51 In so doing, the majority cre-
46 Id. at 1004 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., id. (McLaughlin, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority view that "prose-
cutor [must] prove that the defendant knew that the controlled substance was to enter the
United States); United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1981) (prosecutor in case
involving importation of marijuana had to establish three elements: "(1) the marijuana was
in fact imported, (2) the importation was done knowingly and willfully, and (3) the defend-
ant willfully associated himself with the venture"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
17 See 21 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful... to manufacture or distribute
a controlled substance ... intending that such substance will be unlawfully imported into
the United States ... or knowing that such substance will be unlawfully imported into the
United States.") (emphasis added). Thus, "when [Congress] intended that a defendant had
to know the destination of the controlled substance, [it] knew how to communicate that
idea." Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1003 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
- See LANGUAGE FILES (Dep't of Linguistics, Ohio State Univ., 3d ed. 1985). "Seman-
tics, the study of meaning in language, is concerned with the relationships between the
meanings of words, with the way units of meaning are combined, and with the relationship
of linguistic meaning to nonlinguistic reality." Id. at 179. "[I]ndividual words in a sentence
are organized into ... semantically coherent groupings," known as constituents. Id. at 151.
"Often, an expression is ambiguous because it has more than one possible constituent struc-
ture." Id. at 154.
'9 See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1002-04 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
"o See supra note 48.
It is the syntactic structure (grammatical structure) of a sentence that determines its
meaning, together with the word senses. See LANGUAGE FILES, supra note 48, at 180. "This
relationship between meaning and syntactic form is often described as The Principle of
Compositionality [also known as Frege's Principle, after the philosopher Gottlob Frege, who
first stated it]: the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of its words and by
the syntactic structure in which they are combined." Id. at 180. Therefore, because the lexi-
cal meaning of the individual word "import" is distorted by the majority to imply "into the
United States," this in turn leads to a misinterpretation of the entire phrase in which it
appears. If in fact the words "into the United States" were to follow the phrase "knowingly
or intentionally imports" this would effectively alter the ideas conveyed in the constituent.
U.S. v. LONDONO-VILLA
ated its own definition of the verb "import"52 and made the adver-
bial phrase "knowingly or intentionally" modify the prepositional
phrase "into the United States"-which does not even appear in
section 960.13 It is further asserted that the term "into the United
States" as it appears in section 952 refers to the required jurisdic-
tional nexus only54 in that it specifies the geographic limits within
which the statute may be applied.
The plain meaning of the words contained in sections 952 and
960 does not lead to a conclusive answer regarding Congress' intent
However, these words are noticeably absent from § 960 and common sense dictates that
words should be interpreted with regard to the order in which they appear and not out of
context; nor should they be extracted from one sentence and interpolated into another. See
generally Frank Heny, Sentence Structure, in LANGUAGE 284 (Virginia P. Clark et. al eds.,
4th ed. 1985) ("A sentence is not just a string of words; it is a string of words in a certain
order, a string that has structure."). While it is indeed true that "words are notoriously
imperfect symbols for the communication of ideas," Harry W. Jones, Some Causes of Un-
certainty in Statutes, 36 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1950),
we are constrained.., to leave a considerable part of our meaning to be found out
by interpretation, which, in many cases must necessarily cause greater or less ob-
scurity with regard to the exact meaning, which our words were intended to con-
vey ... However minutely we may define, somewhere, we ... must trust at last to
common sense ...
FRANCIs LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 19-20 (3d ed. 1880).
82 See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). "As a matter of
statutory construction, the majority's interpretation ignores the express definition of the
term 'import', which requires only a 'bringing in or introduction of [the controlled sub-
stance] into any area -. ' Id.
" See id. at 998. Therefore, the Londono-Villa majority construed § 960 as if it read
that a defendant violates § 952 if he "knowingly or intentionally imports a controlled sub-
stance into the United States." See id. at 1002 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1988). The phrase is "jurisdictional" in that it refers to the
limitation on the ability and authority of American courts to convict and punish individuals
acting outside the United States whose actions have no effect in this country. See United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676-77 n.9 (1975).
The Londono-Villa court agreed that §§ 952 and 960 apply to extraterritorial acts; but
it also believed that those acts must be accompanied by a specific intent to cause harm
within the United States. See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 999-1000. However, "[tihe concept
of criminal intent does not extend so far as to require that the actor understand not only
the nature of his act but also its consequence for the choice of a judicial forum." Feola, 420
U.S. at 685. In Feola, the Court stated:
[l]abelling a requirement "jurisdictional" does not necessarily mean . . . the re-
quirement is not an element of the offense Congress intended to describe and to
punish. .. .The significance of labelling a statutory requirement as "jurisdic-
tional" is not that the requirement is viewed as outside the scope of the evil Con-
gress intended to forestall, but merely that the existence of the fact that confers
federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpe-
trates the act made criminal by the federal statute. The question, then, is not
whether the requirement is jurisdictional, but whether it is jurisdictional only.
Id. at 676-77 n.9 (emphasis added).
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with respect to a defendant's state of knowledge, however. Thus, it
is necessary to examine the legislative purpose behind the Act. 55
Other drug control statutes enacted by Congress also shed light on
the issue.
B. Legislative Purpose
The principal purpose of the Act is to combat drug abuse by
strengthening existing law enforcement authority in the area of il-
legal substance control.56 In addition, congressional findings per-
taining to drug trafficking and abuse, embodied in section 801 of
the Act, evidence that Congress was aware that "illegal importa-
tion, . . . distribution, and possession and improper use of con-
trolled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people. '57 Thus, be-
cause a significant amount of narcotics flows through foreign com-
merce, Congress emphasized that "[i]t is . . . essential that the
United States cooperate with other nations in establishing effective
controls over international traffic in such substances."58
It is submitted that in order to effectuate the sweeping con-
gressional purpose of full-scale drug interdiction, a specific intent
" See Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 (1899). "[W]here a statute is of doubtful
meaning and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may look into.., the
reasons which induced the act in question, the mischiefs intended to be remedied .... and
the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its proper construction." Id. at
419.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 1, at 4567. Although the legislative history un-
derlying the Act does not expressly state that § 952 should be applied to peripheral extra-
territorial narcotics traffickers, the Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]his court has never
required that every permissible application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legis-
lative history." Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461, 462 (1990). "[A]Ithough 'criminal
statutes are to be construed strictly ... this does not mean that every criminal statute must
be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legisla-
ture.'" Id. at 467-68. (quoting United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1955)).
" 21 U.S.C. § 801a(2) (1988). Because widespread "[albuse of psychotropic substances
has become a phenomenon common to many countries ... and is not confined to national
borders, id. §801a(1), [i]t is the intent of the Congress that the amendments . . . together
with existing law, will enable the United States to meet all of its obligations" under the
international treaty entitled the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (T.I.A.S. No. 9725,
signed at Vienna, Austria, on Feb. 21, 1971, and entered into force in the United States on
July 15, 1980) and that "no further legislation will be necessary for that purpose," id. §
801a(2); see also United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 272 (1st Cir. 1987) ("To
construe the importation statute in such a stilted manner [as requiring proof of foreknowl-
edge of intended destination] would run at cross purposes with the discernible intent of the
enacting Congress .... ).
"8 21 U.S.C. § 801a(1) (1988).
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requirement should not be read into the language of sections 952
and 960. It is unlikely that Congress intended to create such an
obstacle to the enforcement of narcotics laws given the United
States' "strong interest in halting the flow of illicit drugs across its
borders."59
C. Related Sections
In an attempt to ascertain the meaning of section 952, it is
helpful to examine related sections of the Act and cases construing
them.60 For example, courts interpreting section 959 of the Act,
which proscribes the manufacture and distribution of controlled
substances,6 have required the government to prove that the de-
fendant knew the destination of the manufactured drugs.2 Such
an interpretation is consistent with the language of section 959 be-
cause it explicitly sets forth the requirement of knowledge or in-
tent that the narcotics enter the United States. 3 The government
in Londono-Villa, focusing on the different conduct targeted by
the two sections, thus urged that "[s]ection 959 requires knowledge
proof because the provision proscribes a much broader range of
conduct than [s]ection 952, conduct that without that proof of spe-
cific intent, might well have no effect in the United States. ' '8 4 Sec-
tion 952, on the other hand, specifically prohibits "conduct that
will, by definition, have an effect on the United States."65
Similarly, section 841(a)(1) of the Act makes it an offense
knowingly and intentionally to possess a controlled substance
"with intent to ... distribute. 6 6 Courts have refused to limit the
application of section 841 to only those defendants whose intended
" United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Muench, 694 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1982) (cases decided
under one section of title 21 are instructive in prosecutions under another section of same
Act), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983).
61 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1988).
60 See, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) (de-
fendant may be prosecuted for acts committed outside United States if detrimental effect
occured within United States), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985).
63 See supra note 47.
04 Brief for the United States of America at 19-20, United States v. Londono-Villa, 930
F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1339).
65 Id. at 20.
6 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). The language of § 841 offers no guidance regarding the
scope of the statute and whether it reaches distribution of drugs destined for the United
States only. Id. § 841.
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distribution point was the United States. 7 In United States v.
Muench,6 the Second Circuit indicated that, under section 841,
proof of intent to distribute within the United States is unneces-
sary where actual, knowing possession occurs within the United
States because such possession "supplies the jurisdictional nexus
and obviates the need for proof of intent to distribute within the
United States. s6  Although a showing of specific intent as to the
destination of the narcotics is necessary in illegal importation cases
involving extraterritorial seizures as a means of establishing juris-
diction, it is submitted that such proof should not be required
when the narcotics involved ultimately reach the United States.70
67 See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 818 F.2d 115, 118 (lst Cir. 1987) ("Although
[defendant] did not, apparently, intend to distribute the narcotics in the United States, the
place of intended distribution is not important so long as such intent is established together
with the fact of possession within the United States."); United States v. Gomez-Tostado,
597 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[Nlothing in the legislative history or language of section
841(a)(1) .. .suggests any congressional intent to limit the applicability of the statute to
defendants whose intended distribution point is in this country.").
68 694 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983). In Muench, D.E.A.
agents learned of a scheme by which airline passengers intended to smuggle drugs into West
Germany from South America. Id. at 30. When the flight made a scheduled stop in New
York, customs inspectors removed the luggage from the cargo compartment of the plane and
discovered cocaine in the defendants' suitcases. Id. at 30-31. The defendants were convicted
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under § 841(a)(1). Id. at 31. On appeal, the
defendants argued that their indictments should have been dismissed because § 841 requires
a showing that the defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance in the United
States. Id. at 32. Rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit explained that proof of intent
to distribute within the United States is necessary only to supply a needed jurisdictional
nexus where drugs are seized outside United States territory. Id. at 33.
"9 Id. at 33; see also United States v. Londono-Villa, 735 F. Supp. 543, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (specific intent of person acting outside United States is sufficient jurisdictional
nexus, while proof of such intent is not required where such "nexus is established in other
ways"); United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 16 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981) (while possession of nar-
cotics on high seas with intent to distribute in United States is crime, where possession
occurs within United States, it is "immaterial whether the offender intended to distribute it
elsewhere").
"0 Compare United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1984) (where drugs are
seized outside United States waters, government must prove defendant knew contraband
was destined for United States to convict for conspiring to import) with United States v.
Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 271-72 (1st Cir. 1987) (for conviction for importation where
cocaine was seized within United States territory, government not required to prove defend-
ant airline passenger knew plane was scheduled to stop in United States en route from
Colombia to Switzerland).
In Londono-Villa, the defendant "plainly knew the drugs were being imported some-
where when he loaded the drugs onto the plane and gave the pilot directions out of the
country." Brief for the United States of America at 26, United States v. Londono-Villa, 930
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1339). Therefore, he "cannot be heard to complain that the
sovereign which prosecutes him is not the one he expected." Id.
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II. MENS REA: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONSPIRACY AND AIDING
AND ABETTING
In Londono-Villa, both the majority and the dissent failed to
distinguish between the mens rea required for a conspiracy viola-
tion and that required for the separate and distinct offense of aid-
ing and abetting.71 Essential to a conviction for a drug conspiracy
is proof that two or more people agreed to commit a drug-related
offense, that the defendant knew of this conspiracy and had some
knowledge of its unlawful aims, and that he intended and agreed
to join or associate himself with the objectives of the conspiracy.72
7' See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 997-1000; id. at 1001-04 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 14 (discussing failure of Londono-Villa court to distinguish mens rea
requirement for two different charges). Both the majority and the dissent in Londono- Villa
addressed only the substantive offense of importation and conspiracy to import in violation
of §§ 952 and 963, respectively, and the mens rea necessary for conviction under those two
statutes. See Londono- Villa, 930 F.2d at 997-1001, 1001-04 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). No
attention was given to the mens rea required for conviction for aiding and abetting. The
offense of aiding and abetting importation does not "presuppose the existence of an agree-
ment" and is a separate and distinct offense from conspiracy to import. United States v.
Valencia, 492 F.2d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,
12 (1954)(substantive offense and crime of conspiracy not identical); United States v.
Madalone, 492 F. Supp. 916, 920-21 (S.D. Fla. 1980). In Madalone, the defendant was found
not guilty of conspiracy to import heroin, but guilty of importation of heroin and possession
of heroin with intent to distribute. Id. at 920. The defendant argued that the jury verdict
was inconsistent and he did not have specific intent to distribute the heroin found in his
typewriter case because he intended to distribute it in Montreal. Id. at 918. The court re-
jected these arguments and held that the crime of conspiracy to import is distinct from the
crimes of importation and possession with intent to distribute and that the latter crimes did
not require a showing of specific intent to distribute the heroin within the jurisdictional
confines of the United States. Id.
72 See United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
861 (1986); United States v. Boldin, 779 F.2d 618, 619 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1098 (1986); United States v. Carrascal-Olivera, 755 F.2d 1446, 1450 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1359 (11th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has determined
that "[i]n order to sustain a judgment of conviction on a charge of conspiracy to violate a
federal statute, the Government must prove at least the degree of criminal intent necessary
for the substantive offense itself." United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975) (citing
Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959)). Generally, federal conspiracy statutes
have been construed to require proof of an agreement to commit an offense against the
United States. See Ingram v. United States 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959); Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 12 (1954); United States v. Bright, 550 F.2d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1977).
Black's Law Dictionary defines conspiracy, in part, as "[a] combination or confederacy
between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts,
some unlawful or criminal act ... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 309 (6th ed. 1990).
The criminal law has traditionally defined intent to include "knowledge." See WAYNE
R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 216 (2d ed. 1986). The modern view, how-
ever, is to distinguish between intent and knowledge. Id. While the failure to make such a
distinction may be of little consequence in many areas of criminal law, certain areas, such as
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Thus, conspiracy concerns itself almost exclusively with the state
of mind of the defendant 73 and, in fact, is predicated on the de-
fendant's specific intent to engage in the criminal act marked by
the conspiracy.7
4
In contrast to conspiracy, the charge of aiding and abetting
focuses on the conduct of the defendant rather than his specific
intent.7 5 In United States v. Peoni,76 the Second Circuit held that
to be convicted of aiding and abetting, a defendant must in some
way "associate himself with the venture, . . participate in it as in
something that he wishes to bring about, [and] ... seek by his
action to make it succeed. ' 77 Proof of the defendant's participation
in every stage of the criminal venture is not required. 78 Thus, be-
cause the conspiracy doctrine usually applies to individuals who
are significantly involved in the planning of the substantive of-
attempts and conspiracy, provide "good reason for distinguishing between one's objectives
and knowledge." Id. at 218.
11 See Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The State of Mind Crime-Intent, Proving
Intent and Anti-Federal Intent, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 627, 628-29 (in order to be liable, defend-
ant must have intended the conspiratorial relations).
71 See Appellant's Brief at 31, United States v. Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1991) (No. 90-1339). "The second circuit has repeatedly held that a defendant cannot be
convicted of conspiring to violate a particular statute unless it is found that he had the
Ispecific intent' to violate the statute." Id. (citing United States v. Durham, 825 F.2d 716,
719 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. DiTommasso, 817 F.2d 201, 218 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 993
(2d Cir. 1983)).
75 See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Lia-
bility: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 98 (1985) (secondary parties
accountable for acts of primary party); see also supra note 14 (setting forth text of aiding
and abetting statute).
The term "aid and abet" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as conduct motivated to
"[hlelp, assist, or facilitate the commission of a crime, promote the accomplishment thereof,
[or to] help in advancing or bringing it about." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (6th ed. 1990).
76 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
7 Id. at 402 (L. Hand, J.); see also United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 399 (1st
Cir.) (adopting Peoni language), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Nusraty,
867 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1989) (aiding and abetting requires that defendant knowingly
involve himself in a criminal act).
The federal aiding and abetting statute can be analogized to the New York criminal
facilitation statute. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 115.00-15 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991). The
tenor of the criminal facilitation concept is that assisting in or encouraging the commission
of a crime with knowledge is less culpable than assisting in or encouraging the commission
of a crime with specific intent. See Louis Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Ac-
complice Liability in American Criminal Law-Knowledge or Intent, 51 Miss. L.J. 155, 184
(1980).
78 See Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402 (L. Hand, J.); see also United States v. Gramlich, 551
F.2d 1359, 1364 (5th Cir.) (direct involvement in transportation of contraband not required),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977).
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fense7 1 while accomplice liability generally attaches with a minimal
showing of assistance to the principal," it seems more appropriate
to require proof of specific intent in the conspiracy offense than in
the aiding and abetting violation.
It is asserted that the Londono-Villa court, in relying on case
law involving only conspiracy convictions," erroneously read a spe-
cific intent requirement into the aiding and abetting statute as well
and failed to distinguish between the requisite elements for each
separate and distinct offense. Thus, it struck down the defendant's
conviction for aiding and abetting as well as conspiracy. Because of
the different mens rea requirements, however, the defendant's con-
viction on the aiding and abetting charge should have been sus-
tained, notwithstanding the majority's characterization of the
mens rea for the conspiracy count.
CONCLUSION
In narrowly interpreting the federal drug trafficking statutes
in Londono-Villa, the Second Circuit has lost sight of both the
compelling public policy underlying the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and the clear congres-
sional intent to place a high priority on halting illegal drug traffick-
ing. The court has semantically distorted the meaning of the Act
by reading section 952(a) together with section 960 and, in the pro-
cess, injected a specific intent requirement into the substantive of-
-fense of importation. Consequently, the government must now
carry a heavier burden of proof, proving not only that the defend-
ant intended to import drugs into another country, but also that
he specifically knew or intended the destination of the drugs to be
the United States.
Furthermore, both the majority and the dissent erroneously
blurred the distinction between the mens rea that courts have tra-
ditionally required for conspiracy and that required for aiding and
abetting, thereby erroneously striking down a conviction that
should have been sustained. The severity of the drug problem cur-
rently afflicting our society mandates that sections 952, 960, and
7' See United States v. Rosado-Fernandez, 614 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1980); D.W. Elliott,
Mens Rea in Statutory Conspiracy, a Comment, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 202.
80 See generally Grace E. Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2169 (1988) (discussing accomplice liability).
" See Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d at 999; supra note 29.
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963 of title 21 and section 2 of title 18 be interpreted so as to af-
ford courts the ability to achieve the Act's objectives in adjudicat-
ing cases involving extraterritorial actors who participate-to any
degree-in international drug trafficking.
Jennifer E. Raiola
